CJEU confirms GDPR compensation cannot be replaced by prohibitory injunctions
The Court of Justice’s judgment in Quirin Privatbank (C‑655/23) confirms that the GDPR’s Article 82(1) secures an autonomous, EU‑wide right to compensation for non‑material damage resulting from unlawful processing, including unauthorised third‑party disclosure. The Court reiterated that entitlement to compensation requires damage, a GDPR breach and a causal link, but no minimum threshold of harm or proof of the controller’s fault or intent. Member States may provide complementary remedies under national law, yet the compensatory nature of Article 82 remains central.
The Court clarified that the GDPR does not itself create a general right to a prohibitory injunction, although national systems may recognise such orders to prevent further unlawful disclosures. A prohibitory injunction serves a preventive purpose — stopping recurrence of unlawful processing — and can strengthen data protection remedies at national level. The judgment also confirmed prior case law that non‑material damage must be assessed autonomously under EU law, ensuring consistent protection across Member States.
Significantly, the Court held that the award of a prohibitory injunction cannot be used to reduce or replace financial compensation for non‑material damage payable under Article 82(1). The rationale is that compensation serves exclusively to redress harm already suffered, while an injunction prevents future harm. Consequently, national courts may not treat the preventive measure as a ground for lowering or denying compensation for past non‑material damage caused by unlawful disclosure of personal data.
A remaining practical question concerns harm experienced after an injunction is granted: if an injunction effectively removes the risk of recurrence, whether and how that change in risk should affect the quantum of compensation for ongoing or continuing non‑material harm is not fully explained. The judgment reinforces strong individual remedies under the GDPR but leaves scope for further clarification on how courts should weigh temporal aspects of fear and ongoing distress when both preventive orders and compensation claims coexist.
